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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

DOWNES v. DOWNES: A COURT DOES NOT HAVE
DISCRETION TO GRANT A SURVIVING SPOUSE AN
ADDITIONAL EXTENSION OF TIME IN WHICH TO ELECT
THE STATUTORY SHARE IF A PREVIOUS EXTENSION
EXPIRED PRIOR TO THE NEW REQUEST

By: Brooke Marli Hytovitz

The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that when a previous
extension has expired, a court does not have discretion to grant a
surviving spouse an additional extension of time in which to elect the
statutory share. Downes v. Downes, 388 Md. 561, 880 A.2d 343
(2005). In affirming the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals
held extensions of time must be granted before the previous extension
expires even though § 3-206(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article and
Maryland Rule 6-411(c) provides the court with discretion. Id at 565,
880 A.2d at 345.
Eldridge Downes ("Eldridge") died on October 23, 1997, leaving
Petitioner Shirley Downes ("Shirley") as his surviving spouse. In his
will, Eldridge left all of his tangible personal property to Shirley.
Eldridge also created two trusts, a marital trust for Shirley and a
residuary trust for Eldridge's parents and his son, Respondent Gregory
Shirley was appointed as personal
Downes ("Gregory").
representative and therefore had to file a report to the orphans' court
valuing Eldridge's estate.
According to Maryland Code § 3-203 of the Estates and Trusts
Article, Shirley, as the surviving spouse, could either elect to take her
statutory share of Eldridge's estate or take the property that was
devised to her in the will. In June 1998, one day prior to the decision
deadline, Shirley was granted a three month extension in order to
determine the estate's value. The court then granted three more
extensions pursuant to timely requests. Shirley requested a fifth
extension after the fourth extension had already expired. The request
was subsequently denied in July 1999.
In March 2001, Shirley appealed the denial of the fifth extension
request to the circuit court. The court dismissed Shirley's appeal,
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finding that under § 12-502 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article, the denial of the fifth extension was a final, appealable
judgment and Shirley's appeal was untimely.
Shirley appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in
November 2002 arguing the circuit court has more authority to grant
the extension than the orphans' court because of its de novo review
powers. The Court of Special Appeals remanded the case to the
circuit court because Shirley's claim in regard to her husband's estate
was not fully adjudicated and there was no final, appealable order. On
remand, in the circuit court, Shirley argued it was unjust to deny the
extension because she needed more time to make her decision. The
circuit court was not convinced and held that once the fourth extension
expired, the circuit court did not have the authority to grant another
extension, as a legislative change was necessary to accomplish this
goal.
Shirley again appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, which affirmed the circuit court's decision and held that
according to the relevant statute and Rule, neither an orphans' court
nor a circuit court can grant an extension for a spousal election when
the previous extension has already expired. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari to consider whether an orphans' court, or
a circuit court on appeal, has the discretion to grant a surviving spouse
an extension of time to make a statutory election under §§ 3-203(a)
and 3-206(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article and Maryland Rule 6411 (c) when the previous extension has expired.
The Court first looked at the statutory construction of§ 3-206(a) of
the Estates and Trusts Article and Maryland Rule 6-411(c). !d. at 571,
880 A.2d at 348. The Court found that the specific words used in the
statute ("extend the time for election, before its expiration") and the
rule ("each extension is granted before the expiration of the period
originally prescribed") are clear and unambiguous. !d. at 572, 880
A.2d at 349. Therefore, the orphans' court discretion to grant an
extension is clearly conditioned on it being timely made. !d.
After determining the existence of this limitation, the Court then
addressed three issues stemming from said existence. !d. at 572, 880
A.2d at 349. First, the Court considered whether the limitation applies
to the circuit courts when there is a de novo appeal from the orphans'
court. !d. According to § 12-502(a)(l) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article, when there is an appeal to the circuit court, it
should be heard de novo '"as if there had never been a prior hearing or
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judgment by the orphans' court,' and that judgment is to be 'given
according to the equity of the matter'." !d. at 573, 880 A.2d at 349-50.
The Court found the limitation applies not only to the orphans'
court, but to the circuit court as well. !d. at 573, 880 A.2d at 350. The
Court relied on its previous decision in Estate of Soothcage v. King,
227 Md. 142, 153, 176 A.2d 221, 227 (1961) and observed that "the
circuit court, although expected to make its own determination, is
limited to those that could properly have been made by the orphans'
court." Downes, 388 Md. at 573-74, 880 A.2d at 350 (quoting
Kaouris v. Kaouris, 324 Md. 687, 715, 598 A.2d 1193, 1206 (1991)).
Given the orphans' court did not have the discretion to grant Shirley's
fifth extension, the circuit court is therefore bound by the statutory
restriction and also cannot grant the extension. Downes, 388 Md. at
574, 880 A.2d at 350.
Although Shirley agreed that the statute and rule both required the
extension be granted before the previous one expired, she argued this
instruction was not mandatory or jurisdictional but only directory. !d.
at 571, 880 A.2d at 348-49. Shirley also contended that since the
instruction was only directory, the circuit court had the option to grant
her extension although the previous one had expired. !d. at 571, 880
A.2d at 349.
The second issue discussed by the Court was whether the limitation
described in the statute and rule is jurisdictional in nature, therefore
permitting the circuit court to ignore the limitation and grant an
untimely extension. !d. at 574, 880 A.2d at 350-51. The Court relied
on its previous opinions where it defined jurisdiction as "the power to
render a judgment over that class of cases within which a particular
one falls." !d. at 575, 880 A.2d at 350 (quoting Carey v. Chessie
Computer Servs., 369 Md. 741, 756, 802 A.2d 1060, 1069 (2002)).
The Court held the condition that an extension be granted before
the previous one expired is not a jurisdictional impediment, but
provides a limit on the exercise of the specific jurisdiction. Downes,
388 Md. at 575, 880 A.2d at 351. Therefore, if the Court determined
on appeal that the lower court improperly granted an extension of
time, the decision would be reversed. !d. The Court reasoned that if a
jurisdictional extension was allowed, it would permit a challenge to
the title of property for years to come. !d.
The final issue addressed by the Court was whether the limitation is
mandatory or whether the court has discretion to either grant the
extension or excuse its untimeliness. !d. at 576, 880 A.2d at 351. It
held that a court is expressly prohibited from ignoring the specific
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limitation noted in the statute and rule, thus leaving the court only one
option- to deny the extension. !d. at 576, 880 A.2d at 352.
The Court noted that a surviving spouse's entitlement to repudiate a
will has long been strictly construed. !d. at 577, 880 A.2d at 352
(citing Barrett v. Clark, 189 Md. 116, 122, 54 A.2d 128, 131 (1947)).
Although Shirley properly contends the law is different now from the
time of Barrett, the law continues to strictly construe the ability to
renounce the will. Downes, 388 Md. at 577-78, 880 A.2d at 352-53.
Noting its previous decision in Parshley v. Mott, 241 Md. 577, 578,
217 A.2d 300, 301 (1996), the Court also acknowledged that the law
today still favors "the expeditious administration and early settlement
of Estates." Downes, 388 Md. at 578, 880 A.2d at 353.
The Court of Appeals' holding in Downes reinforces the necessity
for a timely request in which a surviving spouse can elect the statutory
share. The clear and unambiguous meanings of the statute and rule are
strictly construed and prove the courts' discretion is limited by the
specific restriction for a timely request. By implementing the
limitation on a surviving spouse, the Court has shown there must be
limits on how long this process can be delayed. If the restrictions are
not met, the court has no other option but to deny untimely requests.

